Rule 3.1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions (Proposed Rule Adopted by the Board on March 9, 2017)

- (a) A lawyer shall not:
 - (1) bring or continue an action, conduct a defense, assert a position in litigation, or take an appeal, without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person; or
 - (2) present a claim or defense in litigation that is not warranted under existing law, unless it can be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of the existing law.
- (b) A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, or involuntary commitment or confinement, may nevertheless defend the proceeding by requiring that every element of the case be established.

PROPOSED RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.1 (Current Rule 3-200) Meritorious Claims and Contentions

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Commission") evaluated current rule 3-200 (Prohibited Objectives of Employment) in accordance with the Commission Charter. In addition, the Commission considered the national standard of ABA Model Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions). The Commission also reviewed relevant California statutes, rules, and case law relating to the issues addressed by the proposed rules.

Rule As Issued For 90-day Public Comment

Proposed Rule 3.1 in context within the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Proposed rule 3.1 is one of nine rules in Chapter 3 of the proposed rules of Professional Conduct. The general content, framework and numbering scheme of this subset of the rules is based on Chapter 3 of the ABA Model Rules, which is entitled "Advocate." Model Rules Chapter 3 corresponds to Chapter 5 of the current California Rules, entitled "Advocacy and Representation." The following table shows the Chapter 3 Model Rules and the corresponding California Rules:

Model Rule	California Rule		
3.1 (Meritorious Claims & Contentions)	3-200 (Prohibited Objectives of Employment)		
3.2 (Expediting Litigation)	No Cal. rule counterpart.		
3.3 (Candor Toward The Tribunal)	5-200 (Trial Conduct)		
3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party & Counsel)	5-220 (Suppression of Evidence) 5-310 (Prohibited Contact with Witnesses) 5-200(E)		
3.5 (Impartiality and Decorum of Tribunal)	5-300 (Contact with Officials) 5-320 (Contact with Jurors)		
3.6 (Trial Publicity)	5-120 (Trial Publicity)		
3.7 (Lawyer As Witness)	5-210 (Member As Witness)		
3.8 (Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor)	5-110 (Performing the Duty of Member in Government Service) 5-220 (Suppression of Evidence) 5-120 (Trial Publicity)		
3.9 (Advocate In Non-adjudicative Proceedings)	No Cal. Rule counterpart.		

The Commission is recommending the adoption of the Model Rule framework and numbering for this series of rules.

In general, proposed rule 3.1 carries forward the substance of current rule 3-200. Proposed paragraph (a) simplifies the language of the current rule by stating that: A lawyer shall not. . . ." The current rule uses language that refers to the acts of seeking, accepting or continuing prohibited conduct, but the Commission believes that all of these elements are captured in the unambiguous statement that a "lawyer shall not." In addition, the specific concept of restricting

a lawyer from continuing prohibited conduct is included in paragraph (a)(1) that refers to "continuing an action. . . ."

Proposed paragraph (a) also deletes the current phrase "knows or should know." In the context of this particular rule, the current phrase could imply a negligence standard which is not relevant to the determination of probable cause. In addition, the "knows or should know" standard is inconsistent with the malice standard in California law and might require standard of care testimony to prove a violation. It would also be a confusing deviation from the knowledge standards defined in proposed rule 1.0.1. Furthermore, including the "knows or should know" standard needlessly focuses the inquiry on a lawyer's ability to discern motivation rather than on the most important issue of whether a matter has merit.

Paragraph (b) is derived from Model Rule 3.1 and was added to clarify that the proposed rule does not constrain a lawyer for a criminal defendant from requiring that every element of the case be established.

There is no Discussion section in the current rule and the Commission is not recommending the addition of any Comments.

Post-Public Comment Revisions

After consideration of comments received in response to the initial 90-day public comment period, the Commission revised paragraph (b) to expressly include involuntary commitments or confinements.

With these changes, the Board authorized an additional 45-day public comment period on the revised proposed rule.

Final Modifications to the Proposed Rule

After consideration of comments received in response to the additional 45-day public comment period, the Commission made no changes to the proposed rule and voted to recommend that the Board adopt the proposed rule.

COMMISSION REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: RULE 3.1 [3-200]

Commission Drafting Team Information

Lead Drafter: Raul Martinez

Co-Drafters: Howard Kornberg, Lee Harris

I. CURRENT CALIFORNIA RULE

Rule 3-200 Prohibited Objectives of Employment

A member shall not seek, accept, or continue employment if the member knows or should know that the objective of such employment is:

- (A) To bring an action, conduct a defense, assert a position in litigation, or take an appeal, without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person; or
- (B) To present a claim or defense in litigation that is not warranted under existing law, unless it can be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of such existing law.

II. FINAL VOTES BY THE COMMISSION AND THE BOARD

Commission:

Date of Vote: January 20, 2017

Action: Recommend Board Adoption of Proposed Rule 3.1

Vote: 14 (yes) - 0 (no) - 0 (abstain)

Board:

Date of Vote: March 9, 2017

Action: Board Adoption of Proposed Rule 3.1

Vote: 11 (yes) - 0 (no) - 0 (abstain)

III. COMMISSION'S PROPOSED RULE (CLEAN)

Rule 3.1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions

- (a) A lawyer shall not:
 - (1) bring or continue an action, conduct a defense, assert a position in litigation, or take an appeal, without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person; or
 - (2) present a claim or defense in litigation that is not warranted under existing law, unless it can be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of the existing law.

(b) A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, or involuntary commitment or confinement, may nevertheless defend the proceeding by requiring that every element of the case be established.

IV. <u>COMMISSION'S PROPOSED RULE</u> (REDLINE TO CURRENT CALIFORNIA RULE 3-200)

Rule <u>3.1 [3-200] Prohibited Objectives of Employment Meritorious Claims and Contentions</u>

(a) A lawyer shall not:

A member shall not seek, accept, or continue employment if the member knows or should know that the objective of such employment is:

- (A)(1) To bring or continue an action, conduct a defense, assert a position in litigation, or take an appeal, without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person; or
- (B)(2) To present a claim or defense in litigation that is not warranted under existing law, unless it can be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of suchthe existing law.
- (B)(b) A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, or involuntary commitment or confinement, may nevertheless defend the proceeding by requiring that every element of the case be established.

V. RULE HISTORY

Current rule 3-200 originated with the first rules promulgated in 1928 as rule 13. The rule prohibited accepting employment when the motives are improper and specifically provided that:

A member of the State Bar shall not accept employment to prosecute or defend a case solely out of spite, or solely for the purpose of harassing or delaying another; nor shall he take or prosecute an appeal merely for delay, or for any other reason, except in good faith.

Operative January 1, 1975, rule 13 was revised and renumbered as new rule 2-110. In 1972, the State Bar's Special Committee to Study the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility developed two proposed rules addressing the substance of rule 13. A proposed rule was drafted to be identical to rule 13 but was ultimately not adopted. A second rule, proposed rule 2-110, was modeled after ABA Code DR 2-109. The rule carried forward the substance of rule 13 using language adopted from the ABA Code and added a new provision prohibiting litigation claims or defenses not warranted under existing law.

Operative April 1, 1979, rule 2-110 was revised as part of a project to revise the rules governing lawyer advertising. The introductory paragraph of the rule was revised as follows:

A member of the State Bar shall not <u>seek or</u> accept employment to accomplish any of the following objectives, nor shall he the member do so if he the member knows or should know that the person who employs him solicited for or offering the employment wishes to accomplish any of the following purposes...

The revisions were made as conforming changes to the primary changes recommended for the main advertising and solicitation rules. (See, State Bar Special Committee on Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, Final Report 1978).

The rule was last amended in 1989, when rule 2-110 was renumbered as rule 3-200 as part of a comprehensive revision and renumbering of the entire rules. The introductory paragraph was substantively amended, adding the language "or continue" to the phrase "shall not seek or accept employment" to clarify that withdrawal would be required whenever a lawyer knows or should know an action is being maintained for any of the prohibited reasons. Additionally, amendments to paragraph (A) added an objective probable cause standard, and incorporated the limitation on appeals formerly found in paragraph (C). In doing so, the language "solely for delay" was dropped. (See pages 31-32 of Bar Misc. No. 5626, "Request That The Supreme Court Of California Approve Amendments To The Rules Of Professional Conduct Of The State Bar Of California, And Memorandum And Supporting Documents In Explanation," December 1987.)

VI. OFFICE OF CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL / STATE BAR COURT COMMENTS

- Gregory Dresser, Office of Chief Trial Counsel, 9/27/2016 (In response to 90-day public comment circulation):
 - 1. OCTC supports the rule.

<u>Commission's Response:</u> No response required.

• Gregory Dresser, Office of Chief Trial Counsel, 1/9/2017 (In response to 45-day public comment circulation):

For the 45-day public comment version of the rule, OCTC re-submitted substantially the same comments as on the 90-day public comment version of the rule and the Commission's responses to OCTC remained the same.

• State Bar Court: No comments were received from State Bar Court.

VII. SUMMARY OF PUBLIC COMMENTS (INCLUDING COMMENTS SUBMITTED BY THE OFFICE OF CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL AND STATE BAR COURT) & PUBLIC HEARING TESTIMONY

During the 90-day public comment period, five public comments were received. Two comments agreed with the proposed Rule, two comments agreed only if modified, and one comment did not indicate a position. During the 45-day public comment period, one public comment was received. That one comment agreed with the proposed Rule. A public comment synopsis table, with the Commission's responses to each public comment, is provided at the end of this report.

Two speakers appeared at the public hearing. One whose testimony was in support of the proposed rule if modified and another who did not take a position. That testimony and the Commission's response is also in the public comment synopsis table.

VIII. RELATED CALIFORNIA LAW AND ABA MODEL RULE ADOPTIONS

A. Related California Law

1. Code of Civil Procedure

Code of Civil Procedure § 128.7 requires all papers presented to the court to be signed by an attorney certifying that it is not being presented for an improper purpose, that it is warranted by existing law, and that the allegations, denials and factual contentions have evidentiary support.

2. <u>Business and Professions Code</u>

Similar to rule 3-200, statutory provisions prescribing the duties of attorneys mandate that attorneys pursue only those matters that are legal or just and that they take no actions for an improper motive. Business and Professions Code, § 6068, subdivisions (c) and (g) provide it "is the duty of an attorney to do all of the following: ...

- (c) To counsel or maintain those actions, proceedings, or defenses only as appear to him or her legal or just, except the defense of a person charged with a public offense.
- (g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding from any corrupt motive of passion or interest."

3. <u>Disciplinary Cases.</u>

The State Bar Court has applied both the statutory provisions above and rule 3-200 in disciplinary decisions. The following selected case law demonstrates application of these provisions both to cases involving frivolous or unwarranted actions and those involving improper motives.

- Matter of Thomson (Review Dept. 2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 966 Respondent stipulated to violations of rule 3-200 where he commenced action adverse to real property despite a bankruptcy court injunction enjoining actions affecting the real property. The bankruptcy court imposed sanctions and found the attorney's "actions were in bad faith, frivolous and intended to cause unnecessary delay."
- Matter of Lais (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 112 Respondent was found culpable of violating Business and Professions Code, § 6068(c) where, in the underlying matter, respondent had filed an appeal that relitigated issues and challenged rulings of law from the client's earlier, related case. The Court of Appeal had sanctioned respondent, finding the appeal frivolous, devoid of merit, and prosecuted for an improper motive.
- Sorensen v. State Bar (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1036 Respondent was suspended where, after being sued by a court reporting firm for an unpaid bill, he counterclaimed for fraud, turning the \$94.05 court reporter bill into a \$4,000 litigation. The court found that the attorney's fraud action was meritless and that the attorney was motivated by spite and vindictiveness.

4. California Law Related to the Duty of Zealous Advocacy

California case law provides that the "duty of a lawyer both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law." *People v. Bolton* (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 343, 357 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 671] (citing *People v. McKenzie* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616, 631 [194 Cal.Rptr. 462], disapproved on another ground). As noted above, one public commenter expressed concern that rule 3-200 interferes and conflicts with this duty. However, California case law also clarifies that a lawyer's duty of zealous advocacy must be exercised "within the bounds of the law," which include a lawyer's ethical duties and duties owed to the court.

In the disciplinary decision *Matter of Davis*, a bankruptcy court had previously found respondent's actions were frivolous. The Review Department stated that, while the court agreed that "attorneys have a duty to zealously represent their clients and assert unpopular positions in advancing their clients' legitimate objectives, ... attorneys also have a duty to the judicial system to assert only legal claims or defenses that are warranted by the law or are supported by a good faith belief in their correctness." *Matter of Davis* (Review Dept. 2003) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 576, 591. Based on the bankruptcy court's findings, the Review Department rejected respondent's assertion that his conduct was reasonable and therefore taken in good faith. *Id*.

In a civil matter, appellant appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to stop further payment under an existing child support order. The court found the appeal frivolous and, in addressing the appellant's lawyer, stated that "the high ethical and professional standards of a member of the bar and an officer of the court require the attorney to inform the client that the attorney's professional responsibility precludes him or her from pursuing such an appeal, and to withdraw from the representation of the client." *In re*

Marriage of Gong and Kwong (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 510, 521 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 540] (citing Cosenza v. Kramer (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1100, 1103 [200 Cal.Rptr. 18]).

B. ABA Model Rule Adoptions

The ABA State Adoption Chart for the ABA Model Rule 3.1, which is the counterpart to current rule 3-200, revised September 15,2016, is posted at:

- http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_3_1.authcheckdam.pdf [Last visited 2/7/17]
- Thirty jurisdictions have adopted Model Rule 3.1 verbatim, and twelve have adopted a version of Model Rule 3.1 with slight variations. Nine jurisdictions (including California) have a different rule or a materially modified version of Model Rule 3.1. Of those nine jurisdictions, four have a rule that includes a malicious injury element similar to California, six have a rule that includes a harassment element, and seven have a rule that includes a knowledge element.

IX. <u>CONCEPTS ACCEPTED/REJECTED; CHANGES IN DUTIES;</u> NON-SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES; ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED

A. Concepts Accepted (Pros and Cons):

1. In proposed subparagraph (a)(1), retain the current rule term "continue."

<u>Pros</u>: The prohibition against continuing an action once the lawyer discovers that it lacks probable cause is consistent with California case law. The question of whether a lawyer is liable for malicious prosecution for continuing an action after the lawyer discovers that it lacks merit was resolved by the California Supreme Court in *Zamos v. Stroud* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958. Retaining the term "continue" as an express prohibition provides guidance to lawyers and serves as a clear disciplinary standard.

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The thirty jurisdictions are: Arkansas; Colorado; Connecticut; Delaware; Florida; Hawaii; Idaho; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kansas; Kentucky; Louisiana; Minnesota; Mississippi; Missouri; Nebraska; Nevada; New Hampshire; New Mexico, North Carolina; Oklahoma; Pennsylvania; Rhode Island; South Carolina; South Dakota; Utah; Vermont; Washington; and West Virginia.

The twelve jurisdictions are: Alaska; Arizona; District of Columbia; Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts, Michigan; North Dakota; Ohio; Tennessee; Texas; and Virginia.

The nine jurisdictions are: Alabama; California; Georgia; Montana; New Jersey; New York; Oregon; Wisconsin; and Wyoming.

⁴ The four jurisdictions are: Alabama; Georgia; New York; Wisconsin.

⁵ The six jurisdictions are: Alabama; Georgia; Montana; New York; Wisconsin; Wyoming.

⁶ The seven jurisdictions are: Alabama; Georgia; New Jersey; New York; Oregon; Wisconsin; Wyoming.

- Cons: The term is arguably redundant as the concept already exists under California case law and is implicit in the rule. Removing this term tracks the language that OCTC recommended in its 2001 comments.
- 2. <u>In proposed subparagraph (a)(1), retain current rule language "for the purpose of</u> harassing or maliciously injuring any person."
 - Pros: Retaining this provision is in accordance with the California Supreme Court's express direction in its April 15, 2014 letter to the State Bar that the provision in current rule 3-200 should be retained: "[T]he proposed rule should retain the long-standing aspect of California law prohibiting attorneys from asserting claims, defenses, or contentions for an improper purpose or motive to harass or maliciously injure another as embodied in current rule 3-200, its predecessors, and Business and Profession Code § 6068, subdivision (g)."
 - Cons: None identified.
- 3. Add new proposed paragraph (b).
 - O Pros: This provision would clarify that the rule does not constrain a lawyer for a criminal defendant from requiring that every element of the case be established. It effectively sanctions the appropriate advocacy of criminal defense lawyers. The same provision is taken from Model Rule 3.1 and was also proposed by the first Commission.
 - o Cons: None identified.

B. Concepts Rejected (Pros and Cons):

- 1. <u>In the introductory clause to proposed paragraph (a), add phrase "In a proceeding before a tribunal."</u>
 - Pros: This change is in accordance with the Supreme Court's directive in its April 15, 2014 letter, which stated the rule should be limited "to attorney conduct in proceedings before a tribunal."
 - Cons: None identified. The term "tribunal" is defined in proposed Rule 1.0.1(m).
- 2. Retain the term "employment" as found in the title and black letter of the current rule (or alternatively, substitute the term "representation" for employment).
 - Pros: The term is used in the current rule and there is no evidence that it has limited the rule's application.
 - Cons: Retaining the term "employment" (or alternatively "representation") could lead to a limiting interpretation that the rule does not apply to lawyers appearing in propria persona. Case law has applied the rule to lawyers acting

in pro per. Sorensen v. State Bar (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1036. Further, the term "employment" is a vestige of the 1975 California Rules, which imported the term from the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (1969). The ABA Model Rules eliminated the use of that term.

3. From current introductory paragraph, retain prohibition against seeking employment.

- Pros: "Seek" was added to the rule in 1979 as a conforming change to changes recommended for the advertising and solicitation rules.
- Ocons: A prohibition against seeking employment could make an attempt to violate the rule a separate violation even where lawyer never files an action. The prohibition could subject a lawyer to discipline for targeted mailings, even though a lawyer would likely not be able to determine the merits of a suit before being retained.

4. From current introductory paragraph, retain "knows or should know."

- Pros: Including "knows or should know" would ensure that the rule is not limited to the knowledge standard for malicious prosecution. Including this concept reflects the duty to investigate a claim before filing or making an assertion.
- Cons: The phrase "knows or should know" imports a negligence standard, which is not relevant to the determination of probable cause. Such a standard would invite or require expert testimony on the adequacy of investigation. The Supreme Court directed that the rule retain a malicious injury element, which has a malice/intent standard. The "knows or should know" standard is inconsistent with the malice standard and would require standard of care testimony to prove a violation. Furthermore, including this standard focuses the inquiry on the lawyer's ability to discern motivation rather than on whether a matter has merit.

5. In proposed subparagraph (a)(1), add a prohibition "for an improper purpose."

- Pros: This prohibition would conform the Rules to the current law. The
 concept of an improper purpose is found in both California Code of Civil
 Procedure § 128.7⁷ and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 [procedural rules
 requiring certification that actions are meritorious and not presented for an
 improper purpose].
- Cons: There is no need to add an additional prohibition to a clause that the Supreme Court has accepted. See April 15, 2014 Supreme Court letter to

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⁷ Code of Civil Procedure § 128.7(b)(1) provides that a condition for making a filing with a court is that "[i]t is not being presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."

State Bar. The current rule provision that is being carried forward adequately captures the concept of improper motive.

- 6. <u>In proposed subparagraph (a)(1), add "sole" to modify the phrase "purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person."</u>
 - Pros: This concept would limit application of the rule and is consistent with case law holding that actions should be held to be frivolous only when brought for an improper motive or when it indisputably has no merit. *In re Marriage of Flaherty* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650.
 - Ocons: The term "sole" is unnecessary since the rule also requires that an action (or filing) may not be brought without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring. A mixed motive is irrelevant; the rule requires both.
- 7. <u>In proposed subparagraph (a)(1), add prohibition against actions "solely for delay."</u>
 - O Pros: This prohibition would conform the rule to the current law. The concept of delay is found in both California Code of Civil Procedure § 128.7 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 [procedural rules requiring certification that actions are meritorious and not presented for an improper purpose such as to cause unnecessary delay].
 - Cons: A prohibition against bringing an action solely for purposes of delay injects problems in proving a lawyer's state of mind and divining whether the lawyer's purpose was also combined with legitimate objectives designed to advance the client's interests.

This section identifies concepts the Commission considered before the rule was circulated for public comment. Other concepts considered by the Commission, together with the Commission's reasons for not recommending their inclusion in the rule, can be found in the Public Comment Synopsis Tables.

C. Changes in Duties/Substantive Changes to the Current Rule:

- 1. <u>Deletion of "seek."</u> Lawyers would not have an ethical duty cast in terms of seeking employment for a prohibited purpose. The prohibition in the proposed rule is against bringing or continuing an action that is meritless or for an improper purpose.
- 2. <u>Deletion of "knows or should know."</u> The "knows or should know" language in the current Rule refers to the "objective" of the lawyer's employment which is ambiguous as whether this refers to the intent of the lawyer or the client and injects unnecessary problems in proving a lawyer's subjective intent in pursuing litigation. The proposed rule would impose a duty on lawyers to not bring or continue an action without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or

maliciously injuring, regardless of whether the lawyer knows or should know that the objective is to bring such a claim. Lawyers would also have a duty to not bring a claim that is not warranted under existing law regardless of whether the lawyer knows or should know that the objective is to present such a claim.

3. <u>Addition of "In a proceeding before a tribunal."</u> Lawyer conduct prohibited by the proposed rule would be limited to conduct in proceedings before a tribunal.

D. Non-Substantive Changes to the Current Rule:

- 1. Deleting reference to "employment" in both the title and black letter of the Rule to avoid an interpretation that the rule does not apply to lawyers appearing in proper. Case law has applied the rule to lawyers acting in proper. Sorensen v. State Bar (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1036. (See paragraph IX.B.1, above.)
- 2. Changing the title to reflect the rule's content, i.e., that it is not limited to a lawyer who has been retained (employed) by a client. The title is the same as that for Model Rule 3.1.
- 3. Substituting the term "lawyer" for "member".
 - <u>Pros</u>: The current Rules' use of "member" departs from the approach taken in the rules in every other jurisdiction, all of which use the term lawyer. The Rules apply to all non-members practicing law in the State of California by virtue of a special or temporary admission. For example, those eligible to practice pro hac vice or as military counsel. (See, e.g., rules 9.40, 9.41, 9.42, 9.43, 9.44, 9.45, 9.46, 9.47, and 9.48 of the California Rules of Court.)
 - <u>Cons</u>: Retaining "member" would carry forward a term that has been in use in the California Rules for decades.
- 4. Changing the rule number to correspond to the ABA Model Rules numbering and formatting (e.g., lower case letters)
 - Pros: It will facilitate the ability of lawyers from other jurisdictions who are authorized to practice in California under pro hac vice admission (see current rule 1-100(D)(1)) to find the California rule corresponding to their jurisdiction's rule, thus permitting ease of determining whether California imposes different duties. It will also facilitate the ability of California lawyers to research case law and ethics opinions that address corresponding rules in other jurisdictions, which would be of assistance in complying with duties, particularly when California does not have such authority interpreting the California rule. As to the "Con" that there is a large body of case law that cites to the current rule numbers, the rule numbering was drastically changed in 1989 and there has been no apparent adverse effect. A similar change in rule numbering of the Rules of Court was implemented in 2007, also with no apparent adverse effect.

- Cons: There is a large body of case law that cites to the current rule numbers and California lawyers are presumed to be familiar with that numbering system.
- 5. Changing the structure of the introductory clause to paragraph (a) to track language that OCTC suggested in its 2001 comment. Change numbering and beginning of subparagraphs to conform to the new structure.
- 6. In subparagraph (a)(2), substituting "the" for "such."

E. Alternatives Considered:

None.

X. RECOMMENDATION AND PROPOSED BOARD RESOLUTION

Recommendation:

The Commission recommends adoption of proposed Rule 3.1 [3-200] in the form attached to this Report and Recommendation.

Proposed Resolution:

RESOLVED: That the Board of Trustees adopts proposed Rule 3.1 [3-200] in the form attached to this Report and Recommendation.